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CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN 
MASSACHUSETTS: A FLAWED INCENTIVE 
STRUCTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON 
INDIGENT PROPERTY OWNERS 
ANDREW CRAWFORD* 
Abstract: All fifty states and the federal government have civil asset forfeiture 
laws that enable law enforcement agencies to seize property that they suspect has 
been involved in the commission of a crime. Although there are many benefits to 
the system, there are also many flaws. The entire structure of the civil asset forfei-
ture system, at both the federal and state levels, creates incentives for abuse by law 
enforcement. This Note advocates for a series of changes to the current forfeiture 
law in Massachusetts, including requiring a heightened burden of proof, providing 
counsel to indigent property owners, and reforming the incentive structure created 
by the interaction with federal forfeiture law. These statutory safeguards will help 
reduce the disproportionate impact that Massachusetts’s forfeiture law has on lower 
income parties and the general population overall. 
INTRODUCTION 
First, envision a million-dollar motel property that had been family-built, 
owned, and operated since 1955.1 Then envision the federal government work-
ing in conjunction with local law enforcement to seize possession of this mom-
and-pop motel.2 The motel owners are not connected with any sort of criminal 
activity.3 Moreover, the seizure takes place without providing any amount of 
compensation to the owners.4 This can occur through a proceeding known as 
civil asset forfeiture, which allows law enforcement agencies to seize property 
suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime.5 The law enforcement 
agency responsible for the seizure can subsequently sell the property and use any 
                                                                                                                           
 * Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–2015. 
 1 United States v. 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d 298, 303 (D. Mass. 2013); Massachusetts 
Civil Forfeiture: United States v. 434 Main Street, Tewksbury, Mass. (The Motel Caswell): Federal & 
Local Law Enforcement Agencies Try to Take Family Motel from Innocent Owners, INST. FOR JUST., 
http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture (last visited May 13, 2015) [hereinafter Massachu-
setts Civil Forfeiture]. 
 2 See Massachusetts Civil Forfeiture, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Jefferson E. Holcomb et al., Civil Asset Forfeiture, Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in 
the United States, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 273, 273 (2011). 
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profits to supplement its budget.6 The above-outlined seizure was the nightmare 
faced by sixty-nine-year-old Russ Caswell and his family, owners of The Motel 
Caswell (“the Motel”), in Tewksbury, Massachusetts.7 
Russ Caswell’s father built the Motel in 1955 and the family operated the 
Motel for two generations.8 Russ Caswell took over ownership and operation of 
the Motel beginning in 1984.9 On September 29, 2009, the United States brought 
a civil forfeiture action against the Motel under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Re-
form Act (“CAFRA”).10 The government argued that the Motel had been used to 
facilitate illegal activity in the form of drug transactions.11 Specifically, the com-
plaint asserted that the Motel should be subject to forfeiture because it had been 
“used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate 
the commission of, a violation of [the Controlled Substances Act] punishable by 
more than one year of imprisonment.”12 
Leading up to the seizure of the Motel, the city of Tewksbury had become 
increasingly subject to criminal and drug activity.13 The Caswells were aware of 
this trend, and whenever they became suspicious of potential criminal activity 
occurring on their property, they notified the police and fully cooperated with 
them.14 Neither Mr. Caswell nor anyone in his family had ever been involved in 
any sort of criminal activity.15 Although criminal forfeitures occur only after a 
person has been convicted of a crime, civil forfeitures do not require a convic-
tion, or even that charges be brought against the property owner.16 The govern-
ment did not contend that the Caswells were involved in criminal activity; rather, 
it argued that there was a “substantial connection” between the Motel and certain 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Massachusetts Civil Forfeiture, supra note 1. Most state civil asset forfeiture laws return forfei-
ture proceeds to the local law enforcement agency that made the seizure. See Holcomb et al., supra 
note 5, at 277. Forty-two states return at least fifty percent of forfeiture proceeds to law enforcement. 
Id. This creates a clear incentive for local law enforcement to “police for profit” and generate revenue 
for their departments. See id.at 283 (noting that the study results “provide compelling evidence that 
law enforcement agencies consider the . . . financial rewards . . . in determining how to process asset 
seizures”); John L. Worrall, Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Budg-
etary Necessity in Contemporary Law Enforcement, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 171, 175 (2001); Massachusetts 
Civil Forfeiture, supra note 1. 
 7 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 302; Massachusetts Civil Forfeiture, supra note 1. 
 8 See 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
 9 Id.; Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse: Federal & Local Law Enforcement Agencies Try to Take 
Family Motel from Innocent Owners, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civil-
forfeiture-background (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse]. 
 10 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2012); 434 Main Street, 961 
F. Supp. 2d at 301, 302. 
 11 See 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 302. 
 12 Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (2012). 
 13 See Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse, supra note 9. 
 14 Id. 
 15 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 302–03. 
 16 Marian R. Williams et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. 
1, 9 (Mar. 2010), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf. 
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illegal activity, and therefore the property was subject to forfeiture.17 In support 
of this contention, the government pointed to fifteen arrests at the Motel between 
September 30, 1994 and November 30, 2008.18 None of these arrests involved 
Mr. Caswell or any other employee of the Motel.19 Between 1994 and 2011, the 
Caswells had rented rooms to over 125,000 guests.20 
After the government initiated the forfeiture action against the Motel, the 
Caswells became locked in a three-year legal battle with the government to keep 
possession of the Motel.21 Mr. Caswell depleted all of his savings on legal coun-
sel, spending over $100,000 during the course of the dispute.22 Fortunately for 
Mr. Caswell, after he exhausted all his resources, the Institute for Justice, a na-
tional civil liberties law firm, took up his case pro bono.23 Mr. Caswell could not 
have continued fighting the government without the assistance of the Institute 
for Justice.24 
After three years, the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts ruled that the government had failed to meet its burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Motel was substantially connected to il-
legal criminal activity.25 The court reached this decision after consideration of a 
number of factors, including the small number of crimes occurring at the Motel 
over many years, Mr. Caswell’s lack of involvement in any drug-related inci-
                                                                                                                           
 17 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 301, 302–03. 
 18 Id. at 311–16. 
 19 Id. at 301. 
 20 Dick M. Carpenter II et al., Inequitable Justice: How Federal “Equitable Sharing” Encourages 
Local Police and Prosecutors to Evade State Civil Forfeiture Law for Financial Gain, INST. FOR 
JUST. 1, 2 (Oct. 2011), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/private_property/forfeiture/inequitable_
justice-mass-forfeiture.pdf. 
 21 See 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 302. Civil forfeiture actions are brought directly 
against the property allegedly involved in the crime, not against the owner of the property. See id. at 
320 (noting that “civil forfeitures directed in rem are remedial civil sanctions brought directly against 
the property itself”). 
 22 Nick Sibilla, Federal Case Could Make It Easier for Victims to Defend Themselves Against 
Civil Forfeiture, FORBES (Nov. 12, 2013, 4:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/
2013/11/12/federal-case-could-make-it-easier-for-victims-to-defend-themselves-against-civil-forfeiture/. 
 23 Id.; About IJ: Our Mission, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/about (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 24 Press Release, INST. FOR JUST., IJ Scores Major Federal Court Victory in Massachusetts Civil 
Forfeiture Case (Jan. 24, 2013), http://ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture-release-1-24-2013 [herein-
after Press Release]. Mr. Caswell stated that it is “hard to believe anything like this goes on in our 
country, but the government goes after people they think can’t afford to fight. But with IJ’s help, we 
put up a heck of a fight and have won. The public needs to stand up against these abuses of power.” 
Id. 
 25 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 319. One year following his legal victory, Mr. Caswell 
sold the Motel for $2.1 million to developers. Christopher Scott & Grant Welker, Owner Plans to Sell 
Motel Caswell for $2.1 Million; Bowling Alley, Restaurant Planned, LOWELL SUN (May 27, 2014, 
10:27 PM), http://www.lowellsun.com/breakingnews/ci_25843925/owner-plans-sell-motel-caswell-2-
1-million. 
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dents, and the minor scale of the drug-related crimes.26 The court acknowledged 
the importance of the Motel to the Caswell family as a multi-generational family 
business, as well as the fact that the Caswells had worked in conjunction with 
law enforcement for years to prevent crime on the Motel’s property.27 In light of 
these factors, the court concluded that finding a “substantial connection” be-
tween the Motel and drug-related crimes “would be inconsistent with ‘both [the] 
letter and spirit of the law.’”28 
Part I of this Note lays out the historical origins and modern day evolution 
and criticism of civil asset forfeiture law, both nationally and in Massachusetts. 
Part II focuses on the diverse issues raised by Massachusetts’s civil forfeiture 
law, most notably the disproportionate impact civil forfeiture can have on low-
income parties, and the need to reform Massachusetts’s law. Part III advocates 
for several solutions, including the need to provide counsel to indigent parties, 
the need to eliminate equitable sharing, and the need for a higher standard of 
proof in Massachusetts. Although this Note focuses in large part on Massachu-
setts’s forfeiture law, the problems and solutions are applicable to a wide variety 
of state laws. 
I. EVOLUTION AND CRITICISMS OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 
Civil asset forfeiture occurs when the government seizes property it be-
lieves to be connected to the commission of a crime.29 The government’s action 
is classified as action against the property, rather than the property owner.30 Civil 
asset forfeiture is therefore based on the notion that property and inanimate ob-
jects can commit a wrong or break a law.31 This idea can be traced all the way 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. The court distinguished the seizure of the Motel from another case where the Kenmore 
Hotel in Manhattan, NY was successfully seized after several years of investigations by federal and 
local law enforcement officials. See id. at 302 (citing United States v. 143–147 E. 23rd Street, 77 F.3d 
648, 650–51 (2d Cir. 1996)). There, the government presented evidence of drug trafficking that also 
implicated the hotel staff: hotel employees accepted bribes to allow certain people into the building. 
143–147 E. 23rd Street, 77 F.3d at 651. In the case of the Motel, the limited number of transactions 
and small quantity of drugs actually being dealt weighed against finding a “substantial connection” 
between the Motel and illegal activity. 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 319. 
 27 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 304, 326. 
 28 Id. at 319 (quoting United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 
226 (1939)). The court stated that “[f]orfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only when 
within both letter and spirit of the law.” Id. at 317 (quoting One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe 
Coach, 307 U.S. at 226).  
 29 See Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the Enactment of a Right to 
Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 683, 705 
(2011). The federal government and all fifty states have civil asset forfeiture laws. Holcomb et al., 
supra note 5, at 273; see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (2012). 
 30 Rulli, supra note 29, at 705. 
 31 Id. 
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back to the Bible.32 By the eleventh century, the notion of property committing a 
wrong manifested itself in the English Common Law concept of “deodands.”33 
A jury determined that property was a deodand whenever it caused the death of a 
person.34 Once property was deemed a deodand, it was forfeited to the crown.35 
English courts eventually expanded the law of deodands to admiralty law, and 
the Crown used this power to seize merchant vessels and their cargo.36 Deo-
dands formed the basis for modern forfeiture law.37 
A. Evolution of Federal Civil Asset Forfeiture Law 
Shortly after the American Revolution, in 1789, the U.S. Congress enacted 
the first statute authorizing civil asset forfeiture.38 Much like the English Crown, 
Congress used civil asset forfeiture as a sanction against ships that failed to pay 
customs duties.39 Justice John Marshall, later the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, enforced the law and embraced the notion that an inanimate object can 
commit a wrong: “this is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding 
against the vessel for an offence committed by the vessel . . . .”40 
Civil asset forfeiture laws slowly expanded during the course of the 1800s 
and early 1900s, but they became a primary tool in combatting illegal activity 
with the emergence of the war on drugs in the 1970s.41 In 1970, Congress in-
                                                                                                                           
 32 LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 7 (1996). “When 
an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten, but the 
owner of the ox shall not be liable.” Exodus 21:28 (English Standard Version). 
 33 Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 237, 237 (2005). 
 34 Id. For example, if a person died from being kicked by a horse, the horse became a deodand 
and was forfeited to the Crown. Id. at 238. 
 35 Id. at 237. Deodands could be inanimate objects, animals, or even vessels. OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 29 (Little, Brown, & Co., 1923) (1881); Pervukhin, supra note 33, at 
237. 
 36 Scott Ehlers, Policy Briefing: Asset Forfeiture, DRUG POL’Y FOUND. 3 (1999), http://www.
drugpolicy.org/docUploads/Asset_Forfeiture_Briefing.pdf. The power was largely abused by the 
English Crown. Id. The Crown’s abuse of this power was a factor in the start of the American Revolu-
tion and in the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, which protects citizens from having their property 
seized without due process. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 37 United States v. U. S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720 (1971) (noting that “modern forfei-
ture statutes are the direct descendants of this heritage”). 
 38 Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 39, 47 (1789); DEP’T ATTORNEY GEN., HISTORY OF ASSET FORFEI-
TURE, HAW. CRIM. JUST. DIV., http://ag.hawaii.gov/cjd/asset-forfeiture-unit/history-of-asset-forfeiture/ 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2015).  
 39 HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM SEIZURE? 
21 (1995). Import duties made up over eighty percent of revenue in the early years of the federal gov-
ernment. Id. 
 40 United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612); see 
also U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 719. 
 41 Eric Moores, Note, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 781 
(2009). In the 1860s during the Civil War, the federal government used forfeiture actions to seize proper-
ty of Confederate rebels and their supporters. HYDE, supra note 39, at 22. Between 1919 and 1933, dur-
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cluded a civil asset forfeiture provision as part of the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act.42 This provision authorized “the government 
to seize and forfeit drugs, drug manufacturing and storage equipment, and con-
veyances used to transport drugs.”43 Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Congress continued to expand the government’s power to forfeit drug-related 
property, using civil asset forfeiture as a powerful weapon in combatting the na-
tion’s drug problem.44 In 1984, Congress authorized the forfeiture of real proper-
ty that was used or intended for use in the commission of a drug offense, or that 
was purchased with the proceeds obtained from a drug offense.45 This statutory 
scheme provides a useful tool for law enforcement officials to stem the tide of 
illicit drugs because forfeiture actions reduce the ability of criminals to profit 
from illegal activity.46 
Also in 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 
which created an equitable sharing program that enabled federal and state law 
enforcement forces to split the proceeds of any forfeitures.47 The division of 
these assets between law enforcement agencies varies based on the level of local 
law enforcement’s involvement.48 Prior to 1984, state and local law enforcement 
agencies could not share forfeiture proceeds with the federal government.49 
                                                                                                                           
ing Prohibition, Congress expanded civil forfeiture laws to include “violations of the Volstead Act . . . 
[which governed] the production, importation, and consumption of alcoholic beverages.” Id. at 23. As of 
2011, there are over four hundred federal statutes allowing for civil asset forfeiture. John R. Emshwiller 
& Gary Fields, Federal Asset Seizures Rise, Netting Innocent with Guilty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512253265073870. 
 42 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012); Mary Murphy, Note, Race and Civil Asset Forfeiture: A Disparate 
Impact Hypothesis, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 77, 80 (2010). 
 43 Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic 
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 44 (1998); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881; Murphy, supra note 42, at 80. 
 44 See HYDE, supra note 39, at 23. 
 45 21 U.S.C. § 853(b)(1) (2012); id. § 881(a)(6)–(7). Real property includes “any right, title, and 
interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurte-
nances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used” in the commission of a violation pun-
ishable by a year or more in prison. Id. § 881(a)(7). 
 46 Id. § 881(1)(6); John L. Worrall & Tomislav V. Kovandzic, Is Policing for Profit? Answers 
from Asset Forfeiture, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 219, 219 (2008). 
 47 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A)–(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2) (2012); Murphy, supra note 42, at 81. 
Under the new Act, states could potentially keep up to eighty percent of the proceeds. U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 12 
(2009), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ri/projects/esguidelines.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE TO EQUITABLE 
SHARING].  
 48 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3); GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING, supra note 47, at 12. 
 49 LEVY, supra note 32, at 151. 
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B. Early Criticism and Federal Reform Movement 
Following the changes of the two previous decades, civil asset forfeiture 
law attracted heavy criticism in the 1990s.50 These criticisms were introduced 
onto the national stage by U.S. Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), who stated 
that “our civil asset forfeiture laws are being used in terribly unjust ways, and are 
depriving innocent citizens of their property with nothing that can be called due 
process. This is wrong and it must be stopped.”51 Throughout the 1990s, consti-
tutional challenges to civil asset forfeiture arose under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Amendments.52 Although civil forfeiture laws were upheld on constitu-
tional grounds, Representative Hyde went on to propose a civil asset forfeiture 
transformation in 1999—the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act.53 
Representative Hyde’s proposed legislation, which passed the U.S. House 
of Representatives but was amended in the U.S. Senate, created strong protec-
tions for property owners.54 One of the most significant reforms proposed by 
Representative Hyde was the appointment of counsel.55 The proposed legislation 
gave courts discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel to an indigent 
property owner, but the provision did not create an automatic appointment of 
counsel.56 Instead, courts would consider several factors in deciding whether to 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Rulli, supra note 29, at 706. Federal Courts began to express concern about the govern-
ment’s mounting forfeiture power while media and special interest groups mobilized for reform. Id. 
For example, in 1993 the Chicago Tribune “began to raise questions about the propriety of civil for-
feiture.” Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility—The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 
2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1070 
(2002); Blind to Injustice in Forfeitures, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1993, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
1993-04-01/news/9304010101_1_cary-copeland-federal-forfeiture-program-asset-forfeiture.  
 51 Ehlers, supra note 36, at 1; see Roger Pilon, Foreword to HYDE, supra note 39, at vii (noting 
that “[i]t is to the credit of Henry Hyde . . . that a spotlight is shining at last on this dark corner of our 
law”). 
 52 Douglas Kim, Note, Asset Forfeiture: Giving Up Your Constitutional Rights, 19 CAMPBELL L. 
REV. 527, 562–76 (1997). Civil asset forfeiture has been challenged on constitutional grounds under 
the Fifth Amendment due process clause, double jeopardy clause, takings clause, and self-incrimina-
tion violation; under the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause; under the Sixth Amendment as an 
appointment of counsel violation; and under the First Amendment as a freedom of speech violation. 
Id. These constitutional challenges, however, have been unsuccessful. Id. at 561. 
 53 See H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (2000); Kim, supra note 52, at 561; Moores, supra note 41, at 782. 
 54 See H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (2000); Rulli, supra note 29, at 711. 
 55 See Rulli, supra note 29, at 710; Louis S. Rulli, Access to Justice and Civil Forfeiture Reform: 
Providing Lawyers for the Poor and Recapturing Forfeited Assets for Impoverished Communities, 17 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 507, 518 (1998). Although the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel 
in criminal matters, there is no such guarantee in civil cases. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Rulli, supra note 29, at 690. Prior to Representative Hyde’s 
proposed reform, there was no right to counsel in civil forfeiture cases. HYDE, supra note 39, at 81.  
 56 See H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (2000); Rulli, supra note 55, at 519. Representative Hyde had 
proposed reform legislation several years earlier, in 1997, that gave the court discretion to provide 
counsel to indigent property owners if they requested it. H.R. 1965, 105th Cong. 7 (1997) (“If the 
person filing a claim is financially unable to obtain representation by counsel and requests that coun-
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appoint counsel, such as the claimant’s standing and whether or not the claim 
was made in good faith.57 Representative Hyde’s bill, with this provision includ-
ed, overwhelmingly passed the House of Representatives, by a margin of 375 to 
48.58 
Despite Representative Hyde’s efforts, the Senate version of the bill reject-
ed the provision that broadly authorized courts to appoint counsel to indigent 
property owners.59 The bill that Congress ultimately enacted, the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), instead provided for the appoint-
ment of counsel only in one limited situation: where the indigent property own-
er’s primary residence was the subject of the forfeiture action.60 Even with re-
moval of Representative Hyde’s provision that broadly granted appointment of 
counsel, CAFRA still significantly reformed federal civil forfeiture law.61 Alt-
hough Representative Hyde’s provision left the decision of whether to appoint 
counsel to the discretion of the court, the text of CAFRA currently requires the 
court to appoint counsel where the property owner requests it.62 Further, when 
the court appoints counsel to an indigent property owner, the government is re-
quired to pay “reasonable attorney fees and costs . . . regardless of the outcome 
of the case.”63 The government is also liable for the property owner’s attorney 
fees and other reasonable litigation costs in a challenge where the claimant “sub-
stantially prevails.”64 
In addition to appointment of counsel in situations where a primary resi-
dence is the subject of forfeiture, one of CAFRA’s most important reforms 
                                                                                                                           
sel be appointed, the court may appoint counsel to represent that person with respect to the claim.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 57 H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (2000). Representative Hyde’s 1997 proposed legislation included 
consideration of additional factors such as “the nature and value of the property subject to forfeiture, 
including the hardship to the claimant from the loss of the property seized . . . .” H.R. 1965, 105th 
Cong. 7 (1997). 
 58 Rulli, supra note 29, at 711. 
 59 See S. 1931, 106th Cong. 5–6 (1999) (eliminating a provision which allowed for the broad 
appointment of counsel to indigent property owners); Rulli, supra note 29, at 711. 
 60 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 61 See Rulli, supra note 29, at 710; Moores, supra note 41, at 782. 
 62 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A). This section provides: 
If a person with standing to contest the forfeiture of property in a judicial civil 
forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute is financially unable to 
obtain representation by counsel, and the property subject to forfeiture is real 
property that is being used by the person as a primary residence, the court, at 
the request of the person, shall insure that the person is represented by an at-
torney for the Legal Services Corporation with respect to the claim. 
Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, Representative Hyde’s bill proposed that a court may authorize 
counsel to represent an indigent party. See H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 63 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 64 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1) (2012). This provision applies whether or not the claimant’s attorney is 
court appointed or not. See id. 
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heightened the government’s burden of proof to a preponderance of the evi-
dence.65 Previously, the standard was probable cause, and the government only 
needed to show “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt; supported by less than 
prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.’”66 As of 2011, many states, 
including Massachusetts, still used a probable cause standard for their civil for-
feiture laws.67 
C. Civil Asset Forfeiture Law in Massachusetts 
Massachusetts’s civil asset forfeiture law is a formidable weapon for prose-
cutors in combatting drug offenses.68 The statute provides for the forfeiture of 
any controlled substances, as well as materials or equipment used in the creation 
or distribution of controlled substances.69 The law also authorizes seizure of any 
vehicles, money, or real property used in connection with a controlled sub-
stance.70 
Once the Commonwealth commences an action against the property in 
question, the prosecutor must submit affidavits that establish probable cause 
“that ‘the money [seized] was probably derived from illegal drug transac-
tions.’”71 Under the probable cause standard, the Commonwealth does not need 
to establish a connection between the seized property and a particular drug trans-
action.72 Further, the Commonwealth only has the burden to show the “existence 
of probable cause to institute the action . . . .”73 The probable cause standard of 
proof under Massachusetts’s civil asset forfeiture law has been found not to vio-
                                                                                                                           
 65 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1); Rulli, supra note 29, at 710. 
 66 United States v. $250,000, 808 F.2d 895, 897 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. 
$364,960, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981)); see 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1982); $250,000, 808 F.2d at 897 
(“Section 881(d) directs that the burden of proof in a forfeiture action is controlled by 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1615. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1615, the government must initially show probable cause to believe that 
the property was connected with illegal drug transactions.”). 
 67 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d) (2012); Holcomb et al., supra note 5, at 278. 
 68 See John C. McBride, Civil Forfeitures, in MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL 
PRACTICE MANUAL § 24.1 (2006) (stating that “[o]ne of the most potent weapons a prosecutor has in 
fighting the war on drugs is the Massachusetts Forfeiture Statute, G.L. c. 94C, § 47”); Ernest H. Short, 
Civil Forfeiture of Real Property and the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 73 OKLA. B.J. 
1727, 1737 (2002) (noting that “Congress provided law enforcement a powerful weapon” in the use of 
civil forfeiture).  
 69 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(a)(1)–(2). 
 70 Id. § 47(a)(3), (5), (7). The statute indicates that a vehicle or money need not be used in con-
nection with a controlled substance; it is enough if the vehicle or money was “intended for use” in 
connection with drugs. Id. § 47(a)(3), (5). 
 71 Commonwealth v. Brown, 688 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 (Mass. 1998) (quoting $250,000, 808 F.2d 
at 900); McBride, supra note 68, at 6. 
 72 Brown, 688 N.E.2d at 1360.  
 73 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d) (2012) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. One 2004 
Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Mass. 2010). 
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late a defendant’s right to due process under the Massachusetts Constitution.74 
Once the Commonwealth’s initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the property 
owner to prove that the property is not forfeitable.75 
The statute further provides that law enforcement in Massachusetts keeps 
one hundred percent of the proceeds from forfeited property.76 The profits are 
split: half of the proceeds from forfeited property are passed to the prosecutor’s 
office and half go to the local or state police involved in the seizure of the prop-
erty.77 Unlike under federal law, the law in Massachusetts does not provide for a 
right to counsel or the payment of the property owner’s attorney fees in any situ-
ation.78 
D. Basis of the Current Massachusetts Forfeiture Law  
and Recent Applications 
The current civil forfeiture law in Massachusetts is based on pre-CAFRA 
federal forfeiture law.79 In 1989, the statute was amended and the burden of 
proof for the Commonwealth was lessened to a probable cause standard, which 
was “virtually identical to the burden of proof imposed on the Federal govern-
ment in Federal forfeiture actions” at the time.80 As Representative Hyde began 
to garner support for reform in the mid-1990s, Congress responded in 2000 with 
passage of CAFRA, which altered the federal burden of proof.81 The Massachu-
setts Legislature, however, has not raised its burden of proof.82 Consequently, 
because Massachusetts’s civil forfeiture law is based on pre-CAFRA federal for-
                                                                                                                           
 74 Brown, 688 N.E.2d at 1362 (noting that the Commonwealth’s forfeiture statute provides suffi-
cient procedural safeguards and that “[c]ivil forfeiture proceedings are sufficiently distinguishable 
from the criminal proceedings . . . to allow the former to proceed under a lesser burden of proof with-
out contravening State due process guarantees”). 
 75 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d). 
 76 See id. 
 77 Id. There is proposed legislation currently awaiting action that would amend these percentages 
so that the proceeds of forfeiture actions would be split three ways: 33% to the prosecutor, 33% to the 
police department, and 34% to a new drug prevention fund. H.D. 1238, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 
2013). 
 78 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47 (2012). 
 79 One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89. 
 80 Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d). Before 1989, Massachu-
setts’s civil forfeiture statute required that the Commonwealth prove all material facts by a preponder-
ance of the evidence at trial. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 47 (West 1988); One 2004 Audi 
Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89.  
 81 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2012); One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89; see Rulli, supra 
note 29, at 725. CAFRA raised the federal government’s burden of proof to a preponderance of the 
evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). “Preponderance of the evidence is defined as ‘superior evidentiary 
weight that, though sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to 
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.’” White Collar Crime: 
Asset Forfeiture, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_
collar/asset-forfeiture (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 82 One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89. 
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feiture law, Massachusetts courts do not look to CAFRA to interpret the Massa-
chusetts statute; instead, courts in Massachusetts look to interpretations of the 
federal forfeiture statute that preceded CAFRA.83 This is problematic because, 
although CAFRA has heightened the evidentiary burden in civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings for the federal government, Massachusetts is still using a lower stand-
ard of proof, thus decreasing protections for Massachusetts property owners.84 
The legislative history of CAFRA indicates that the burden of proof was raised 
from probable cause to preponderance of the evidence because “burdens of proof 
are intended in part to ‘indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate 
decision.’”85 Given the potential impact of a forfeiture proceeding, Congress 
determined that “a meager burden of proof like probable cause” was insufficient 
for federal civil asset forfeitures.86 
The courts in Massachusetts have recognized that under the forfeiture stat-
ute, “the government’s burden is not to prove probable cause but to prove ‘the 
existence of probable cause to institute the action.’”87 The Commonwealth can 
demonstrate “probable cause to institute the action” by presenting sound reason 
to believe that there is a connection between the property seized and illicit activi-
ty.88 In demonstrating “sound reason” for the connection, the Commonwealth 
may use evidence that is traditionally not admissible at trial, namely, hearsay.89 
The admissibility of hearsay makes the Commonwealth’s burden of proof com-
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id.  
 84 See United States v. 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d 298, 318 (D. Mass. 2013); One 2004 
Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89.  
 85 H.R. REP. No. 106-192, at 15 (1999) (quoting United States v. $49,576, 116 F.3d 425, 429 (9th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 86 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 15. The House Judiciary noted that “[t]he stakes are exceedingly high 
in a forfeiture proceeding: [c]laimants are threatened with permanent deprivation of their property, from 
their hard-earned money, to their sole means of transport, to their homes.” Id. 
 87 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d) (2012); One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89 
(emphasis added). In Commonwealth v. One 2004 Audi Sedan Automobile, the Supreme Judicial Court 
noted that “[f]ederal courts that have interpreted the pre-CAFRA language of 19 U.S.C. § 1615, however, 
have uniformly concluded that, while the Attorney General must have probable cause to institute the 
forfeiture action, he did not have to prove probable cause until trial.” 921 N.E.2d at 91. 
 88 One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89. The Supreme Judicial Court held that “sound 
reason” means “more than ‘mere suspicion’ but less than ‘prima facie proof . . . .’” Id. at 49 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. $14,200, 653 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1995)). Once the prosecution has met its burden of 
proof, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property 
should not be forfeited. Victoria R. Kelleher, Collateral Consequences, in TRYING DRUG CASES IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 15-1, 15-26 (Stephanie Page ed., 2010). It is important to note that there is a higher 
burden of proof for claimants (preponderance of evidence vs. probable cause for the Commonwealth). 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d); see Kelleher, supra. This is not the case in the federal statute. See 
18 U.S.C. § 983(d), (g) (2012). 
 89 See One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89–90.  
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parable to the low burden that is required in seeking an indictment and is a lower 
burden of proof than that which is required at a probable cause hearing.90 
Similarly, the pre-CAFRA standards of the federal forfeiture statutes al-
lowed admission of hearsay evidence.91 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit criticized the process, stating that the government “need not pro-
duce any admissible evidence and may deprive citizens of property based on the 
rankest of hearsay and the flimsiest of evidence.”92 In line with the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s disapproval, the passage of CAFRA in 2000 disallowed the use of hearsay 
for the purpose of proving the government’s case.93 Massachusetts law, however, 
continues to allow hearsay evidence—which would be inadmissible in a trial—
in forfeiture actions.94 
Even though the Commonwealth may not have sufficient evidence to prove 
its case at trial, “the Commonwealth acts responsibly by instituting the action 
and leaving to a claimant the statutory burden of proving entitlement to the 
property at issue.”95 This is problematic because many claimants do not have the 
resources necessary to contest a forfeiture.96 As a result, in the case of low-
income property owners who are unable to challenge forfeitures, hearsay may be 
the only evidence the Commonwealth needs to successfully seize property.97 
Additionally, many seizures go unchallenged because the cost of litigation can 
exceed the value of the property taken.98 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Id. at 89; Commonwealth v. $14,200, 653 N.E.2d 153, 157–58 (1995). Massachusetts courts 
have explained this small distinction to mean that “in seeking an indictment . . . the Commonwealth 
may present reliable hearsay, but at a probable cause hearing it is limited to admissible evidence.” One 
2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89 (citing $14,200, 653 N.E.2d at 157–58).  
 91 United States v. $12,390, 956 F.2d 801, 811 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 92 See id. 
 93 See 21 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1); United States v. $92,203, 537 F.3d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that § 983(j) of CAFRA allows the use of hearsay in seeking temporary restraining orders and that it 
would be unnecessary for § 983(j) to explicitly allow hearsay if Congress intended hearsay to be used 
in all forfeiture proceedings); Editor’s Blog: Civil Forfeiture, Summary Procedures and the Hearsay 
Rule, FED. EVIDENCE REV. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://federalevidence.com/blog/2010/november/civil-
forfeiture-summary-procedures-and-hearsay-rule. CAFRA reversed hundreds of years of practice 
during which the government was allowed to use hearsay to meet its burden of proof. Stefan D. Cas-
sella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government Forfeiture Authority and 
Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97, 109 (2001). 
 94 See One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89. 
 95 Id. (citing $14,200, 653 N.E.2d at 158). 
 96 See H.R. REP. No. 106-192, at 17 (1999); HYDE, supra note 39, at 81; LEVY, supra note 32, at 
130. At a Congressional hearing in 1999 before the passage of CAFRA, Representative Hyde was 
quoted as saying “[i]t isn’t much good to say you have the right to get your property back if you can’t 
afford a lawyer . . . .” Emshwiller & Fields, supra note 41.  
 97 See One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 921 N.E.2d at 89–90; LEVY, supra note 32, at 130. 
 98 See HYDE, supra note 39, at 81; LEVY, supra note 32, at 130; see also Inequity Seen in Drug 
Forfeiture Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1993, at A17 (reporting that 94% of the more than 6000 forfei-
ture cases filed by San Jose prosecutors in 1992 involved less than $5000). One of the main ad-
vantages to small seizures for law enforcement is that “claimant challenges to them are impractical 
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E. General Criticisms of Civil Asset Forfeiture Law 
There are many criticisms of civil asset forfeiture laws at both the federal 
and state levels.99 First, civil asset forfeiture laws disproportionately impact low-
income property owners.100 Challenging the government’s seizure of property 
can be incredibly expensive.101 Hiring an attorney is almost a necessity to navi-
gate the complex legal landscape of forfeitures, and there is significant expense 
involved in doing so.102 Many lower-income property owners simply do not 
have the financial resources necessary to challenge the seizures.103 Before 
CAFRA, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a study that found that 
“[e]ighty-five percent of the FBI and DEA cases, and nearly ninety-nine percent 
of the INS cases are uncontested.”104 
                                                                                                                           
because they would cost more than the amounts involved.” Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 43, at 77 
n.154.  
 99 See Ehlers, supra note 36, at 8–11; Williams et al., supra note 16, at 17. Proponents of civil 
asset forfeiture argue that the Department of Justice’s high success rate in forfeiture proceedings is a 
sign that the practice is working. Emshwiller & Fields, supra note 41. Supporters also maintain that 
civil asset forfeiture is a good way to compensate victims of a crime. Id. For example, authorities have 
recovered over $650 million from convicted fraudster Bernie Madoff’s assets for victims who lost 
money in his decades-long Ponzi scheme. Emshwiller & Fields, supra note 41; Wife Says She and 
Madoff Tried Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/business/wife-
says-she-and-madoff-tried-suicide.html. Some supporters believe that civil forfeiture actions should 
occur more often. Emshwiller & Fields, supra note 41. Charles Intriago, a former prosecutor and cur-
rent president of the International Association for Asset Recovery, maintained that “even an impris-
oned criminal ‘can have a smile on his face because he is going to be able to enjoy the proceeds of his 
crime when he gets out.’” Id. 
 100 See HYDE, supra note 39, at 32; LEVY, supra note 32, at 130 (noting that there is no right to an 
attorney in civil forfeiture cases and describing how “the government can use forfeiture to deny peo-
ple the ability to pay lawyers to defend themselves against seizure”); Ehlers, supra note 36, at 9. 
 101 See LEVY, supra note 32, at 130; Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, The Drug War’s Hidden 
Economic Agenda, NATION, Mar. 9, 1998, at 11, 11–12 (recounting the story of a pilot who incurred 
over $85,000 in legal fees and had to file for bankruptcy after a drug dealer chartered his plane and the 
government brought suit against the plane); Nick Sibilla, supra note 22 (noting that Russ Caswell had 
over $100,000 in attorney’s fees). 
 102 See LEVY, supra note 32, at 130 (noting that legal fees in a federal forfeiture action can easily 
reach $25,000); Chloe Cockburn, Easy Money: Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuse by Police, AM. CIV. LIB-
ERTIES UNION BLOG RTS. (Feb. 3, 2010, 1:16 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/
easy-money-civil-asset-forfeiture-abuse-police (noting that a standard retainer fee is $5000 in Geor-
gia). One defense attorney stated that if the government seizes a person’s car, it is not worth suing to 
get it back: “If they take your car, it’s gone. Unless I get pissed off and take a case for the sweet 
pleasure of revenge, I’m not going to handle anything less than $75,000 in assets, from which I’d get 
one-third.” LEVY, supra note 32, at 130. 
 103 LEVY, supra note 32, at 130. 
 104 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong. 248 (1996). Before CAFRA, in order to challenge a federal seizure of property, the 
property owner had to first post a bond equal to the lesser of $5000 or ten percent of the value of the 
property. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988); HYDE, supra note 39, at 82. CAFRA eliminated that requirement. 
John L. Worrall, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?, 27 
POLICING INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGY & MGMT. 220, 230 (2004). 
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Another common criticism of civil asset forfeiture law is that the burden of 
proof for the government is too low.105 The most difficult standard for the gov-
ernment is beyond a reasonable doubt—the standard required in criminal cas-
es.106 As of 2010, only four states require this high standard for civil asset forfei-
ture.107 In contrast, probable cause is the lowest standard of proof as it only re-
quires a reasonable belief that the property is connected to a crime.108 Fourteen 
states, including Massachusetts, use this standard of proof for civil asset forfei-
ture.109 The most common standard of proof for civil asset forfeiture laws is pre-
ponderance of the evidence, which is required by twenty-seven states as well as 
the federal government.110 This burden of proof is more demanding than proba-
ble cause but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.111 
The low standard of proof for civil asset forfeiture is significant because, 
along with the federal government, nearly every state uses a standard of proof 
that falls short of the standard required for a criminal conviction, and criminal 
activity is the typical justification for the forfeiture in the first place.112 In cases 
like that of Mr. Caswell, the motel owner whose property was seized under the 
federal statute, he did not need to be found guilty of a crime for the government 
to seize his motel and livelihood.113 Because of the lower burden of proof for 
civil forfeitures compared to criminal forfeitures, the Institute for Justice found 
that eighty percent of forfeitures occur without any criminal prosecution.114 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse, supra note 9. 
 106 Williams et al., supra note 16, at 20. 
 107 Id. The study also noted that California only uses civil asset forfeiture laws in certain situa-
tions and that North Carolina essentially does not have civil asset forfeitures, only criminal forfeitures. 
Id. at 20, 22. After eliminating these two instances, essentially only two other states require the be-
yond a reasonable doubt burden of proof. See id. at 22. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. States requiring only probable cause prior to civil asset forfeiture include Alabama, Alaska, 
Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming; 
additionally, states in which only some property can be seized under a probable cause standard include 
Georgia, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington. Id.  
 110 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2012); Williams et al., supra note 16, at 22. The states that use a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard include Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Williams et al., supra note 16, at 22. 
 111 Williams et al., supra note 16, at 22. This standard “generally equates to the idea that it is 
more likely than not that the property is related to criminal conduct and thus subject to forfeiture.” Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See 434 Main Street, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 319. 
 114 Williams et al., supra note 16, at 22. In a civil forfeiture action, the piece of property itself is 
the defendant, rather than the property owner, and the burden is on the government to show by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that the property was connected to illegal activity. Emshwiller & Fields, supra 
note 41. Comparatively, in a criminal forfeiture proceeding, the individual must first be convicted, 
where the burden of proof is higher, before the government can seize property. Id. 
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Further, state and local law enforcement forces have a large financial incen-
tive to abuse civil asset forfeiture laws.115 There is a strong profit motive because 
civil asset forfeiture laws provide an opportunity for state law enforcement 
agencies to generate revenue.116 Most state statutes provide for at least 50% of 
the proceeds from civil asset forfeiture to return to local departments.117 For ex-
ample, in Massachusetts, 100% of the proceeds of a forfeiture go back to law 
enforcement—50% to the prosecutor’s office and 50% to the police department 
involved in the seizure.118 The federal government also views civil asset forfei-
ture as a means to generate revenue, and often federal law enforcement will col-
laborate with local law enforcement to seize property.119  
A federal policy known as equitable sharing undermines any state’s efforts 
to mitigate the problem of policing for profit.120 Equitable sharing arose out of 
Congress’s passage of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.121 When state 
and federal law enforcement work together in a civil forfeiture, the proceeds are 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 43, at 56 (noting that it is problematic to allow law enforce-
ment to keep the assets they seize and that “[i]t takes no special sophistication to recognize that this 
incentive constitutes a compelling invitation to police departments to stray from legitimate law en-
forcement goals in order to maximize funding for their operations”); Worrall, supra note 6, at 173 
(providing evidence that “a substantial proportion of law enforcement agencies are dependent on civil 
asset forfeiture, that forfeiture is coming to be viewed not only as a budgetary supplement, but as a 
necessary source of income”); Ehlers, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that “[s]ometimes police are more 
interested in seizing assets than taking drugs off the streets”). 
 116 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 43, at 56; Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse, supra note 9. 
 117 Williams et al., supra note 16, at 17. According to a report by the Institute for Justice, twenty-
six states provide in their statutes that one hundred percent of the proceeds of forfeitures go back into 
state law enforcement. Id. Forty-two states see at least fifty percent of proceeds returned to law en-
forcement, whereas eight states bar the use of proceeds from forfeiture by law enforcement. Id. 
 118 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d) (2012). A proposed amendment limited the amount of 
proceeds going back into law enforcement to sixty-six percent. H.D. 1238, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 
2013). In June, 2014, the Massachusetts House placed a “study order” on the bill, which required that 
the bill be studied during the recess. H.D. 4218, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2014). A study order is often 
used as a quiet means to kill a bill, so it’s unlikely the amendment will pass. See The Legislative Pro-
cess, MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASSOCIATION (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.massbar.org/legislative-
activities/the-legislative-process.  
 119 Johnson, supra note 50, at 1069; see Kyla Dunn, Reining in Forfeiture: Common Sense Re-
form in the War on Drugs, PUB. BROADCASTING SERVICE FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/forfeiture.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). In United States v. 
James Daniel Good Property, the Supreme Court cited a 1990 memo in which the U.S. Attorney General 
explicitly addressed the need to increase civil forfeitures in order to reach budgetary projections, stating 
that “we must significantly increase production to reach our budget target.” 510 U.S. 43, 56 n.2 (1993). 
The memo noted that “the President’s budget for FY 1990 project[ed] forfeiture deposits of $470 million. 
Through the first nine months of the year, deposits total[ed] $314 million.” See Johnson, supra note 50, 
at 1069 n.123. This demonstrates the federal government’s reliance on forfeiture actions to generate 
revenue. See James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 56 n.2. 
 120 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 43, at 111; Moores, supra note 41, at 794; Ehlers, supra note 
36, at 11. 
 121 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A), (e)(3) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2) (2012); Moores, supra note 41, 
at 794. 
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split, with up to eighty percent going to the state law enforcement agency.122 
Consequently, state attempts to limit the proceeds of forfeitures that are granted 
to law enforcement can be circumvented by the state law enforcement agency 
working in conjunction with the federal government.123 Further increasing the 
seriousness of this issue is evidence that equitable sharing has substantially in-
creased in recent years.124 Payments from the federal government to state and 
local agencies nearly doubled from slightly over $200 million in 2000 to $400 
million in 2008.125 
II. CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS’ CORRUPTING INFLUENCE AND 
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON LOW-INCOME PROPERTY OWNERS 
Some critics have argued that allowing law enforcement to keep the pro-
ceeds of forfeitures presents a significant risk of corrupting values.126 The incen-
tive structure created by both federal and state forfeiture laws can lead to priori-
tization of generating revenue over fair and equitable enforcement of the law.127 
The monetary influence of civil asset forfeiture is especially problematic for sus-
ceptible and vulnerable population segments such as low-income parties.128 In-
digent property owners, like Mr. Caswell, often lack the resources necessary to 
combat an unjust seizure of property that arises from the flawed incentive struc-
ture that encourages policing for profit.129 Accordingly, low-income parties need 
statutory protections to help guard against potential abuse.130 The lack of protec-
tions in Massachusetts’s law is troubling.131 Although the Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Reform Act (“CAFRA”) could still be more protective of indigent property 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See City of Concord v. Robinson, 914 F. Supp. 2d 696, 703 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (noting that 
once a forfeiture action is completed, “the local law enforcement agency typically receives a signifi-
cant portion of the money back for its own use”); GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING, supra note 47, at 
12. 
 123 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 43, at 111; Moores, supra note 41, at 794; Ehlers, supra note 
36, at 11. 
 124 See Williams et al., supra note 16, at 32. 
 125 Id. As of 2009, 8000 state and local law enforcement agencies had received over $4.5 billion 
in forfeited assets from the Department of Justice. Richard Weber, Foreword to GUIDE TO EQUITABLE 
SHARING, supra note 47. 
 126 LEVY, supra note 32, at 152; see HYDE, supra note 39, at 29. Even officials responsible for 
enforcing forfeiture laws admit that the desire for profit sometimes overrides the fair application of 
law. HYDE, supra note 39, at 106. For example, Michael Zeldin, the director of the Department of 
Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Office under former President Bush, declared that “the desire to deposit 
money into the asset forfeiture fund became the reason for being of forfeiture, eclipsing in certain 
measure the desire to effect fair enforcement of the laws . . . .” Id. at 29. 
 127 LEVY, supra note 32, at 152. 
 128 See Ehlers, supra note 36, at 9. 
 129 See HYDE, supra note 39, at 81; Worrall & Kovandzic, supra note 46, at 234. 
 130 See HYDE, supra note 39, at 81–82; Ehlers, supra note 36, at 12–13. 
 131 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47 (2012); Williams et al., supra note 16, at 65. 
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owners, it made some important reforms that Massachusetts has not.132 Massa-
chusetts must do more to protect low-income parties from unjust civil asset for-
feiture.133 
A. The Motel Caswell Demonstrates the Need for Reforming  
Civil Asset Forfeiture Law 
Russ Caswell, the Tewksbury motel owner discussed in the introduction of 
this Note, avoided losing his motel because the Institute for Justice represented 
him pro bono.134 Although Mr. Caswell was very fortunate in that respect, many 
lower-income Americans are not so lucky.135 Even the preliminary act of initiat-
ing legal action to recover a piece of property that has been seized by the gov-
ernment can cost thousands of dollars, and legal counsel is necessary to navigate 
the complexities of forfeiture actions.136 Many Americans cannot afford the legal 
assistance essential to contest forfeiture actions and retrieve the property that has 
been taken from them.137 
Mr. Caswell’s successful fight against the government could easily have re-
sulted otherwise.138 Mr. Caswell had limited financial ability to challenge the 
government.139 One of Mr. Caswell’s attorneys recognized that “[w]hat the gov-
ernment did amounted to little more than a grab for what they saw as quick cash 
under the guise of civil forfeiture.”140 The Motel Caswell was just one of the 
many commercial properties in Tewksbury with crimes committed on its prem-
ises.141 Police in Tewksbury had made drug-related arrests at both a nearby Mo-
tel 6 and a Fairfield Inn, as well as in Wal-Mart and Home Depot parking lots.142 
Mr. Caswell’s attorneys pointed out that those businesses are corporate entities 
backed by teams of powerful lawyers and other substantial resources that would 
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enable them to contest a potential seizure; this is in stark contrast to the family-
owned Motel Caswell.143 
One of Mr. Caswell’s attorneys at the Institute for Justice declared that 
“[t]his case epitomizes what an aggressive U.S. attorney wielding these laws can 
do to a small property owner like Russ Caswell.”144 Representative Hyde, who 
proposed reform legislation two decades ago, foresaw the Caswells’ problem 
exactly: in a 1999 speech he described the forfeiture of a hotel that the govern-
ment seized because drug dealers conducted illegal transactions on the premis-
es.145 Although Representative Hyde eventually achieved reform of forfeiture 
law on the federal level, Massachusetts’s state forfeiture law remains unchanged 
over the past two decades.146 
B. The Civil Asset Forfeiture System’s Flawed Incentive Structure 
Perhaps the biggest criticism of the entire civil asset forfeiture system is its 
incentive structure.147 Critics argue that the system encourages policing for profit 
because proceeds gained from forfeiture actions go directly back to law en-
forcement to fund a variety of needs.148 The problem with this type of system is 
that it creates a conflict of interest and grants more power to overzealous police 
departments against innocent victims.149 One influential scholarly article noted 
that “[i]t takes no special sophistication to recognize that this incentive consti-
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tutes a compelling invitation to police departments to stray from legitimate law 
enforcement goals in order to maximize funding for their operations.”150 The 
article asserted that law enforcement agencies target certain types of criminals in 
order to maximize their forfeiture profits.151 For example, law enforcement tar-
gets drug buyers instead of sellers because they have cash, which can be retained 
by law enforcement agencies, whereas the drugs found on sellers must be de-
stroyed.152 According to one former law enforcement officer, “[t]his strategy was 
preferred by every agency and department with which I was associated because 
it allowed agents to gauge potential profit before investing a great deal of time 
and effort.”153 For years, critics relied predominantly on anecdotal examples to 
demonstrate that the forfeiture system encourages policing for profit.154 Howev-
er, the question of whether law enforcement is motivated by financial gains in 
initiating forfeiture actions is ultimately an empirical one.155 
In recent years, several studies have produced substantial empirical evi-
dence to support the contention that law enforcement at both the federal and 
state levels use civil forfeiture laws to “police for profit.”156 In 2008, one 
ground-breaking study (the “Worrall study”) examined the effect of restrictive 
state forfeiture laws on law enforcement’s use of equitable sharing with the fed-
eral government.157 The study examined 572 law enforcement agencies across 
the United States.158 It found that local law enforcement agencies in states with 
generous forfeiture laws received significantly fewer equitable sharing payments 
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than local agencies in states with restrictive forfeiture laws.159 This finding 
demonstrates that law enforcement agencies consider the financial gains when 
instituting a forfeiture action.160 According to the study, local law enforcement 
will partner with federal officials in order to circumvent restrictive state forfei-
ture laws, which allows them to maximize profits for their departments under the 
federal equitable sharing program.161 
In 2011, another study (the “Holcomb study”) built on the Worrall study’s 
findings by examining several other potential factors in a law enforcement agen-
cy’s decision to institute a forfeiture action.162 In addition to the percentage of 
forfeiture proceeds returned to law enforcement, the Holcomb study also meas-
ured the extent to which a state’s burden of proof requirements affected local law 
enforcement’s choice to pursue forfeiture actions through federal equitable shar-
ing.163 The Holcomb study confirmed the findings of Worrall’s 2008 study: law 
enforcement agencies in states with forfeiture statutes that are less generous to 
police departments pursue forfeiture actions through the federal equitable shar-
ing avenue more often than their counterparts in states with generous forfeiture 
laws.164 Additionally, the Holcomb study hypothesized that local law enforce-
ment agencies in states with lower burdens of proof for forfeiture actions will 
pursue fewer forfeitures through federal equitable sharing.165 The study con-
firmed this hypothesis, finding that law enforcement agencies in states with 
higher burdens of proof received more proceeds from federal equitable shar-
ing.166 
The findings of both the Holcomb and Worrall studies suggest that local 
law enforcement agencies pursue forfeitures through federal equitable sharing to 
circumvent their own state’s forfeiture laws when the state’s laws are more bur-
densome or less financially rewarding than the federal alternative.167 The study 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Id. at 237. Generous forfeiture laws are those that reward law enforcement with the proceeds 
of a forfeiture action. Id. at 225. For example, Missouri’s forfeiture law does not allow forfeiture pro-
ceeds to go back into law enforcement. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.623 (2000). If the local law enforcement 
agency teams up with federal authorities for a forfeiture, however, the local Missouri agency can collect 
up to eighty percent of the proceeds under the federal equitable sharing program. GUIDE TO EQUITABLE 
SHARING, supra note 47, at 12. This increase of profits for the local agency incentivizes local law en-
forcement to circumvent restrictive state forfeiture laws. See Holcomb et al., supra note 5, at 282; 
Worrall & Kovandzic, supra note 46, at 234. 
 160 Worrall & Kovandzic, supra note 46, at 237. 
 161 Id. at 234. 
 162 See Holcomb et al., supra note 5, at 273. 
 163 Id.  
 164 Id. at 280. 
 165 Id. at 279. 
 166 Id. at 280. 
 167 Id. An investigation in Missouri following a change in Missouri’s forfeiture law provided 
additional evidence that policing for profit occurs. See Dunn, supra note 119. In 1993, Missouri 
passed a forfeiture law requiring criminal convictions of property owners before seizure of the proper-
ty can occur and further requiring all proceeds to go directly into a state education fund, rather than 
2015] Civil Asset Forfeiture in Massachusetts: A Flawed Incentive Structure 277 
provides empirical evidence that state law enforcement agencies are influenced 
by financial incentives when deciding how to initiate a forfeiture action.168 In 
other words, they “police for profit” and seek to generate the greatest revenue 
from their forfeiture operations, using a variety of tactics to do so.169 The finan-
cial motivations behind forfeiture actions have the potential to disproportionately 
impact lower income parties.170 This is because one way for law enforcement 
agencies to generate profits is to target low-income parties who are financially 
incapable of challenging seizures.171 
There is limited evidence that police target low-income parties, but infor-
mation obtained under the Freedom of Information Act in 1992 revealed some 
targeting of low-income property owners.172 Michigan law enforcement agencies 
seized 54 homes with an average value of $15,881 at a time when the nation’s 
house price was over $100,000.173 They also seized 807 automobiles with an 
average value of $1412.174 The incentive structure built in to the civil asset for-
feiture system encourages this type of targeting.175 One goal of forfeiture actions 
is to generate revenue, and targeting low-income parties is an easy way to ac-
complish that goal.176 
III. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CORRUPTION AND 
PROTECT INDIGENT PROPERTY OWNERS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
The low burden of proof in Massachusetts, the financial incentives built in-
to the civil asset forfeiture system, and the high cost and complexity of initiating 
legal action to reclaim seized property are all problematic aspects of the Massa-
chusetts’s civil asset forfeiture practice.177 This is especially true considering 
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forfeiture laws’ disproportionate harm to lower income parties.178 There are a 
number of solutions that could ameliorate these problems.179 First, in states such 
as Massachusetts, where there is a low burden of proof required, the burden of 
proof should be raised.180 Second, equitable sharing between states and the fed-
eral government should be eliminated in order to limit state law enforcement’s 
ability to police for profit.181 At a minimum, the percentage of proceeds that can 
be returned to the states should be decreased.182 Finally, providing counsel to 
indigent property owners in Massachusetts in civil asset forfeiture cases would 
greatly reduce the disproportionate impact that seizures have on low-income 
parties.183 
A. Raising the Burden of Proof in Massachusetts 
Under Massachusetts’s forfeiture law, the Commonwealth’s burden of 
proof is only “the existence of probable cause to institute the action . . . .”184 
Probable cause is the lowest burden of proof in any state’s civil asset forfeiture 
law.185 In meeting this low hurdle, the Commonwealth may rely on hearsay evi-
dence that would be otherwise inadmissible in a trial.186 The ease with which the 
Commonwealth may initiate and succeed in a forfeiture action, coupled with the 
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financial motivations built into the forfeiture system, is problematic because it 
incentivizes law enforcement to target low-income parties.187 One way to resolve 
this problem is to raise the burden of proof in Massachusetts.188 
As described above, the low burden of proof for civil forfeiture in Massa-
chusetts is based on federal forfeiture law as it was prior to the passage of the 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (“CAFRA”).189 When CAFRA was adopted, 
federal law enforcement’s burden of proof was raised from probable cause to a 
preponderance of the evidence because of the exceedingly high stakes involved 
in a forfeiture proceeding.190 However, Massachusetts law has not followed the 
federal changes that occurred in 2000 with CAFRA’s passage and the burden of 
proof remains low.191 At a minimum, Massachusetts should follow the federal 
government’s example and raise its burden of proof to a preponderance of the 
evidence.192 This would be logical given that Massachusetts’s statutory scheme 
regarding forfeiture actions was initially modeled after federal law.193 
To best protect property owners and low-income parties with reduced re-
sources, Massachusetts should raise its burden of proof to the highest standard: 
beyond a reasonable doubt.194 Beyond a reasonable doubt should be the burden 
of proof in a civil forfeiture action because criminal activity is the justification 
for initiating a forfeiture action and to punish individuals for criminal activity, 
the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.195 The Due Process 
Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt before imposition of a criminal 
punishment because of the significant potential loss.196 The same potential for 
significant loss arises in civil forfeiture cases—deprivation of a property owner’s 
home or livelihood, as demonstrated by Mr. Caswell’s case.197 The government 
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should not be able to avoid this due process requirement “simply by labeling a 
sanction civil when it is truly criminal in nature.”198 
Raising the burden of proof in Massachusetts would help reduce the harm-
ful impact of forfeiture actions on low-income property owners: a higher burden 
would make it more difficult for the Commonwealth to succeed.199 Making suc-
cess more difficult disincentivizes law enforcement from initiating actions that 
amount to an easy grab for cash, and consequently protects low-income individ-
uals who would otherwise not have the resources to defend against these ac-
tions.200 
B. Diverting Forfeiture Proceeds Away from Law Enforcement  
and Eliminating Equitable Sharing Used to Circumvent  
Stringent State Laws 
Empirical evidence in the studies described above strongly suggests that 
state law enforcement agencies seek to generate revenue through forfeiture ac-
tions and that they use a variety of tactics to do so.201 One way for law enforce-
ment agencies to generate profits is to target low-income parties who are finan-
cially incapable of challenging seizures.202 The incentive structure built into the 
civil asset forfeiture system encourages this type of targeting.203 If one goal of 
forfeiture actions is to generate revenue, then targeting the poor is an easy way to 
accomplish this goal.204 In order to eliminate the potential targeting of indigent 
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property owners, the incentive structure of the civil asset forfeiture system must 
be changed.205 
One way to alter the incentive structure behind the current civil forfeiture 
policy is to eliminate the use of forfeiture proceeds for law enforcement.206 In 
Massachusetts, 100% of forfeiture proceeds are awarded to law enforcement.207 
The Massachusetts Legislature has proposed an amendment reducing that num-
ber to 66%, while the remaining 34% would be directed into a drug prevention 
fund.208 Although this would be a step in the right direction, ideally the entirety 
of forfeiture proceeds would be directed somewhere besides law enforcement, 
into areas such as the state’s general treasury fund.209 By directing forfeiture 
proceeds into a state’s general treasury fund rather than directly back into law 
enforcement, the incentive for law enforcement to “police for profit” is de-
creased.210 Removing the financial incentives from forfeiture actions would help 
guard against corrupting law enforcement values.211 
Equitable sharing, however, provides a means for local law enforcement to 
circumvent state laws that attempt to cut down on policing for profit.212 There-
fore, in order for states to be effective in their efforts to reduce the financial in-
centives within the forfeiture system, the equitable sharing program must be 
eliminated.213 At a minimum, the percentage of proceeds that can be returned to 
the states through equitable sharing should be decreased.214 Currently, states are 
able to realize returns of up to eighty percent from the federal government.215 If 
the amount of return were reduced to a lesser percentage, that would help mini-
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mize the loophole that allows local law enforcement to circumvent more strin-
gent state forfeiture laws.216  
C. Providing Counsel to Indigent Property Owners in Civil  
Forfeiture Cases in Massachusetts 
One way to reduce the potentially disproportionate impact on low-income 
parties is to provide counsel to parties that are unable to independently retain 
representation.217 Representative Hyde’s proposed legislation included a provi-
sion providing legal counsel to anyone unable to afford it.218 The legislative his-
tory of the bill acknowledged the importance of such a provision, even though 
there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in civil cases.219 Further, the 
House Committee on the Judiciary recognized that the lack of counsel for indi-
gent property owners was “undoubtedly one of the primary reasons why so 
many civil seizures are not challenged.”220 The Committee believed that civil 
forfeiture proceedings were extremely punitive in nature and consequently rec-
ommended that counsel should be made available for indigent property own-
ers.221 
Massachusetts’s law currently does not provide counsel to indigent property 
owners, regardless of the situation.222 Enacting a provision providing counsel to 
indigent property owners would greatly alleviate the disproportionately harmful 
impact of forfeiture laws on lower income parties.223 Given that the Massachu-
setts law was modeled after pre-CAFRA federal law, Massachusetts should at 
the very least follow the changes to federal law instituted by CAFRA by provid-
ing counsel to indigent property owners when the subject of the forfeiture is a 
primary residence.224 Further, Massachusetts should encourage expanded access 
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to counsel by authorizing an award of attorney’s fees to a property owner who 
“substantially prevails” in a civil forfeiture proceeding.225 This provision helps 
lessen the impact forfeiture laws have on low-income parties because it encour-
ages lawyers to represent indigent property owners.226 Even though an indigent 
property owner cannot pay for counsel, an award of attorney’s fees provides a 
financial incentive for lawyers to aid indigent property owners in forfeiture ac-
tions if they believe the property owners can prevail.227 
Massachusetts should adopt a provision providing counsel for indigent 
property owners in all civil forfeiture actions, as recommended for CAFRA by 
the House Committee on the Judiciary.228 The punitive and potentially devastat-
ing nature of forfeiture actions on low-income parties makes statutory reform in 
Massachusetts a necessity.229 At the very least, the Massachusetts Legislature 
should follow the path established by CAFRA over one decade ago.230 The pro-
visions created by CAFRA establish important protections that help reduce the 
disproportionate impact of forfeiture actions on indigent property owners.231 
CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts’s civil asset forfeiture scheme disproportionately impacts in-
digent property owners. Modeled after the federal civil asset forfeiture law, 
which has since undergone significant reforms with the passage of the Civil As-
set Forfeiture Reform Act (“CAFRA”), Massachusetts’s law remains largely 
unmodified. The significant protections extended to low-income parties by 
CAFRA have not been adopted by the Massachusetts Legislature. The low bur-
den of proof in Massachusetts, the financial incentives built into the civil asset 
forfeiture system, and the high cost and complexity of initiating legal action to 
reclaim seized property are all problematic, especially for low-income parties. 
Allowing law enforcement to keep the proceeds of forfeitures that they at-
tain presents a significant risk of corruption. The financial incentive behind for-
feiture actions could lead law enforcement to initiate frivolous actions that gen-
erate revenue but are legally deficient. Because low-income parties often lack 
the resources to challenge such actions, statutory protections are necessary to 
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help guard against potential abuse. The lack of protections in Massachusetts’s 
law is troublesome. Massachusetts law enforcement keeps one hundred percent 
of the proceeds from forfeited property. Unlike the federal law, Massachusetts 
law does not provide for a right to counsel or the payment of the property own-
er’s attorney’s fees in any situation. The burden of proof is also the lowest in the 
country. 
To remedy these concerning issues, there are several reforms that should 
occur. First, in Massachusetts specifically, the burden of proof should be raised 
to a more protective standard: beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, providing 
counsel to indigent property owners in civil asset forfeiture cases would greatly 
ameliorate the disproportionate impact that seizures have on lower income par-
ties. Finally, equitable sharing between states and the federal government should 
be eliminated. State efforts to reform civil forfeiture law are undermined by the 
process of equitable sharing. Equitable sharing provides a vehicle for local law 
enforcement to circumvent more stringent state laws and it should therefore be 
eliminated. At a minimum, the percentage of proceeds that can be returned to the 
states should be decreased. Without these reforms, the civil asset forfeiture re-
gime enables overzealous law enforcement agencies to pad their budgets at the 
expense of low-income property owners. 
